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Notes
EQUITY-INJUNCTION PROHIBITING A NUISANCE-RESTRAINT OF
VIOLATION OF USURY LAW-Defendant conducted a small loan
business and the rate charged was nominally below the amount
allowed by law. But in order to obtain a loan the borrower was
required to take out insurance through the defendant for a mini-
mum of $1,000. This, however, was not assigned to guarantee
repayment of the loan. The amount of the loan, consisting of
principal and interest, plus the cost of the premium of which the
defendant received a 70% commission, was placed upon a single
note and repaid by the borrower over a period of time. Held,
that an injunction restraining this practice is permissible even
though the loan is illegal and unenforceable. The fundamental
purpose of the usury statute is to benefit the poor debtor class
and this may best be accomplished by preventive measures aimed
at a scheme designed to evade the statute. Commonwealth ex
rel. Grauman v. Continental Co., Inc., 121 S. W. 49 (Ky. App.
1938).
The injunction, equity's chief weapon, has long been issued
when the remedy at law is inadequate. While it is a settled
rule that equity does not enforce criminal law,1 the fact that a
statute is criminal in nature and provides penalties does not
necessarily preclude the issuance of an injunction.2 In a rather
controversial class of cases, injunctions have often been issued,
upon petition of the state, to stop practices which constitute pub-
lic nuisances.3 Thus the selling of liquor,4 the refusal of an owner
of cattle to submit them to tuberculin tests,, the keeping of a
house of prostitution, 6 the conducting of bull and prize fights,7
1. Moir v. Moir, 182 Iowa 370, 165 N.W. 1001 (1918); State v. Conragan,
54 R.I. 256, 171 Atl. 326 (1934).
2. U.S. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (D.C.N.D. Ill.
1929), aff'd, 52 F. (2d) 318 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 538, 52 S.Ct.
311 (1932); State v. Nelson, 189 Minn. 87, 248 N.W. 751 (1933); State Bar of
Oklahoma v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 170 Okla. 246, 37 P. (2d) 954 (1934).
3. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895); Sanitary Dis-
trict v. U.S., 266 U.S. 405, 45 S.Ct. 176, 69 L.Ed. 352 (1925); State v. Smith, 43
Ariz. 131, 29 P. (2d) 718 (1934).
4. State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 88 Neb. 669, 130 N.W. 295 (1911) (en-
joining sale of liquor on trains); State v. Marston, 64 N.H. 603, 15 Atl. 222
(1888) (enjoining sale of liquor upon certain premises).
5. People v. Huls, 355 Ill. 412, 189 N.E. 346 (1934); State v. Heldt, 115 Neb.
435, 213 N.W. 578 (1927).
6. People v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156, 108 N.E. 994 (1915).
7. The courts have enjoined the use of premises for the proposed illegal
exhibition but refused to enjoin the principals: Columbian Athletic Club v.
State, 143 Ind. 98, 40 N.E. 914 (1895); Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 Ky.
212, 75 S.W. 261 (1903); State v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S.W. 1078 (1907).
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the conducting of gambling operations,8 and the practice of den-
tistry and medicine without a license g have all been enjoined as
public nuisances even though a penalty had been provided for
refusal to conform to the law. From this it is but a short step to
the philosophy that upon the state rests the obligation of serving
as guardian of the health, welfare and general interests of its
citizens and that injunctions should be issued when these are
threatened. 10 The problem lies in determining just how far in-
junctive relief may be carried without an undue encroachment
upon the ordinary remedies of law.
In addition to penalties by way of forfeiture of interest, many
states provide for the criminal prosecution of usurers. 11 It was
not until 1929 that the flexible arm of equity reached out to assist
in protection against usury. In State v. McMahon,12 a Kansas
court enjoined the exaction of excessive interest charges. The
court stated that the practice was a grievous anti-social evil and
that the usury statute, which provided as a penalty that the sum
of interest over the legal rate should be deducted from the prin-
cipal and interest, did not provide an actual safeguard for the poor
debtors. In the situation contemplated many of the borrowers
were unaware of the protection afforded them by law. The loan
companies also threatened garnishment proceedings which would
cause the borrowers to lose their jobs and consequently the
debtor was afraid to refuse payment of the usurious charges. In
Means v. State8 it was held that an adequate remedy was pro-
vided by a statute declaring usurious contracts void and allowing
8. State v. Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Co., 121 Neb. 248, 236 N.W. 736 (1931)
(turf exchange); Jones v. State, 38 Okla. 218, 132 Pac. 319 (1913) (horse rac-
ing). Contra: State v. Patterson, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 465, 37 S.W. 478 (1896)
* (gambling house).
9. Kentucky State Board of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281
S.W. 188 (1926); People v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 368, 14 N.E. (2d) 439 (1938), noted
in (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 99. Contra: Dean v. State, 151 Ga. 371, 106 S.E. 792.
(1921).
10. This principle was first clearly applied In In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564,
15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895).
11. Calif. Gen. Laws (Hennings, 1920) Act 5395; N. M. Ann. Stat. (1929)
II 89-106; N. Y. Cons. Laws, C. 40 (Penal Law) § 2400; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923)
c. 228, § 8; S. D. Rev. Code (1919) § 4382; Tenn. Ann. Code (Shannon, 1913)
§ 6732; Utah Comp. Laws (1917) § 3322. New Jersey reached the same results
by allowing an Indictment against the nuisance of maintaining a disorderly
house, State v. Martin, 77 N.J.L. 652, 73 AtI. 548 (1909). Contra: Common-
wealth v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160 S.W. 1042 (1913). Cf. Art.
2924, La. Civil Code of 1870, providing that the usurious interest may be sued
for and recovered within two years from the time of payment.
12. 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 906 (1929); noted in (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 499,
(1930) 15 Cornell L. Q. 472, and (1930) 39 Yale L. R. 590.
13. Means v. State, 75 S.W. (2d) 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
[Vol. I
NOTES
double recovery of any usurious interest paid, and the court re-
fused to enjoin such business.
It is submitted that the present decision in following the
more liberal Kansas rule reaches a desirable result. The usury
statutes, providing for forfeiture of interest and criminal prose-
cution, supply a remedy which theoretically may be adequate but
actually fails to afford a much needed protection to the indigent
debtor.
J.B.D.
INSURANCE--INTERPRETATION OF FIDELITY BOND-WARRANTIES
AND REPRESENTATIONS-At the request of plaintiff, a commercial
partnership, defendant surety company executed a fidelity bond
covering plaintiff's employee. The bond contained a stipulation
that "all statements which the employer has furnished to the
Company concerning the employee or his duties or accounts are
warranted by the employer to be true." The obligations assumed
by the plaintiff in the written application-to have an inventory
of the stock and an audit of the plaintiff's books made at regular
intervals by a special representative-were breached prior to the
employee's defalcation. The defendant urges such breaches as de-
fenses to an action on the bond. Held, that, strictly construed, the
representations which were breached did not concern "the em-
ployee or his duties and accounts" and are not referred to in the
bond sufficiently to constitute warranties the terms of which
must be strictly complied with. Handelman's Chain Stores v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 184 So. 827 (La. App. 1938).
Fidelity bonds are contracts of insurance,' and the general
rules of insurance relative to representations and warranties ap-
ply in determining the legal effect of the breach of undertakings
in the application.2 Where statements have been expressly and
1. 1 Couch on Insurance (1929) 331, § 167; American Bonding & Trust Co.
of Baltimore, Md. v. Burke, 36 Colo. 49, 85 Pac. 692 (1906); Auto Truck Steel
Body Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co., 218 Ill. App. 230 (1920); George A.
Hormel & Co. v. American Bonding Co. of Baltimore, 112 Minn. 288, 128 N.W.
12, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 513 (1910).
2. Vance on Insurance (2 ed. 1930) 384, § 111; Moulor v. American Life
Ins. Co., 111 U.S. 335, 4 S.Ct. 466, 28 L.Ed. 447 (1884); American Life & Acci-
dent Ins. Co. v. Walton, 133 Ark. 348, 202 S.W. 20 (1918); Spence v. Central
Accident Ins. Co., 236 Ill. 444, 86 N.E. 104, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 88 (1908); Teeple v.
Fraternal Bankers' Reserve Society, 179 Iowa 65, 161 N.W. 102, L.R.A. 1917C,
858 (1917); Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Brashears, 89 Md. 624, 43
19391
